君主论-the prince(英文版)- 第14部分

he　weakest　party　will　alwaysassist　the　outside　forces　and　the　other　will　not　be　able　to　resist。　TheVeians；　moved；　as　I　believe；　by　the　above　reasons；　fostered　theGuelph　and　Ghibelline　factions　in　their　tributary　cities；　and　althoughthey　never　allowed　them　to　e　to　bloodshed；　yet　they　nursed　thesedisputes　amongst　them；　so　that　the　citizens；　distracted　by　theirdifferences；　should　not　unite　against　them。　Which；　as　we　saw；　did　notafterwards　turn　out　as　expected；　because；　after　the　rout　at　Vaila；　oneparty　at　once　took　courage　and　seized　the　state。　Such　methods　argue；therefore；　weakness　in　the　prince；　because　these　factions　will　never　bepermitted　in　a　vigorous　principality；　such　methods　for　enabling　one　themore　easily　to　manage　subjects　are　only　useful　in　times　of　peace；　but　ifwar　es　this　policy　proves　fallacious。4。　Without　doubt　princes　bee　great　when　they　overe　thedifficulties　and　obstacles　by　which　they　are　confronted；　and　thereforefortune；　especially　when　she　desires　to　make　a　new　prince　great；　who　hasa　greater　necessity　to　earn　renown　than　an　hereditary　one；　causesenemies　to　arise　and　form　designs　against　him；　in　order　that　he　may　havethe　opportunity　of　overing　them；　and　by　them　to　mount　higher；　as　by　aladder　which　his　enemies　have　raised。　For　this　reason　many　consider　thata　wise　prince；　when　he　has　the　opportunity；　ought　with　craft　to　fostersome　animosity　against　himself；　so　that；　having　crushed　it；　his　renownmay　rise　higher。5。　Princes；　especially　new　ones；　have　found　more　fidelity　and　assistancein　those　men　who　in　the　beginning　of　their　rule　were　distrusted　thanamong　those　who　in　the　beginning　were　trusted。　Pandolfo　Petrucci；　Princeof　Siena；　ruled　his　state　more　by　those　who　had　been　distrusted　than　byothers。　But　on　this　question　one　cannot　speak　generally；　for　it　variesso　much　with　the　individual；　I　will　only　say　this；　that　those　men　who　atthe　mencement　of　a　princedom　have　been　hostile；　if　they　are　of　adescription　to　need　assistance　to　support　themselves；　can　always　begained　over　with　the　greatest　ease；　and　they　will　be　tightly　held　toserve　the　prince　with　fidelity；　inasmuch　as　they　know　it　to　be　verynecessary　for　them　to　cancel　by　deeds　the　bad　impression　which　he　hadformed　of　them；　and　thus　the　prince　always　extracts　more　profit　fromthem　than　from　those　who；　serving　him　in　too　much　security；　may　neglecthis　affairs。　And　since　the　matter　demands　it；　I　must　not　fail　to　warn　aprince；　who　by　means　of　secret　favours　has　acquired　a　new　state；　that　hemust　well　consider　the　reasons　which　induced　those　to　favour　him　who　didso；　and　if　it　be　not　a　natural　affection　towards　him；　but　onlydiscontent　with　their　government；　then　he　will　only　keep　them　friendlywith　great　trouble　and　difficulty；　for　it　will　be　impossible　to　satisfythem。　And　weighing　well　the　reasons　for　this　in　those　examples　which　canbe　taken　from　ancient　and　modern　affairs；　we　shall　find　that　it　iseasier　for　the　prince　to　make　friends　of　those　men　who　were　contentedunder　the　former　government；　and　are　therefore　his　enemies；　than　ofthose　who；　being　discontented　with　it；　were　favourable　to　him　andencouraged　him　to　seize　it。6。　It　has　been　a　custom　with　princes；　in　order　to　hold　their　states　moresecurely；　to　build　fortresses　that　may　serve　as　a　bridle　and　bit　tothose　who　might　design　to　work　against　them；　and　as　a　place　of　refugefrom　a　first　attack。　I　praise　this　system　because　it　has　been　made　useof　formerly。　Notwithstanding　that；　Messer　Nicolo　Vitelli　in　our　timeshas　been　seen　to　demolish　two　fortresses　in　Citta　di　Castello　so　that　hemight　keep　that　state；　Guidubaldo；　Duke　of　Urbino；　on　returning　to　hisdominion；　whence　he　had　been　driven　by　Cesare　Borgia；　razed　to　thefoundations　all　the　fortresses　in　that　province；　and　considered　thatwithout　them　it　would　be　more　difficult　to　lose　it；　the　Bentivoglioreturning　to　Bologna　came　to　a　similar　decision。　Fortresses；　therefore；are　useful　or　not　according　to　circumstances；　if　they　do　you　good　in　oneway　they　injure　you　in　another。　And　this　question　can　be　reasoned　thus：the　prince　who　has　more　to　fear　from　the　people　than　from　foreignersought　to　build　fortresses；　but　he　who　has　more　to　fear　from　foreignersthan　from　the　people　ought　to　leave　them　alone。　The　castle　of　Milan；built　by　Francesco　Sforza；　has　made；　and　will　make；　more　trouble　for　thehouse　of　Sforza　than　any　other　disorder　in　the　state。　For　this　reasonthe　best　possible　fortress　is　……　not　to　be　hated　by　the　people；　because；although　you　may　hold　the　fortresses；　yet　they　will　not　save　you　if　thepeople　hate　you；　for　there　will　never　be　wanting　foreigners　to　assist　apeople　who　have　taken　arms　against　you。　It　has　not　been　seen　in　ourtimes　that　such　fortresses　have　been　of　use　to　any　prince；　unless　to　theCountess　of　Forli；　when　the　Count　Girolamo；　her　consort；　was　killed；　forby　that　means　she　was　able　to　withstand　the　popular　attack　and　wait　forassistance　from　Milan；　and　thus　recover　her　state；　and　the　posture　ofaffairs　was　such　at　that　time　that　the　foreigners　could　not　assist　thepeople。　But　fortresses　were　of　little　value　to　her　afterwards　whenCesare　Borgia　attacked　her；　and　when　the　people；　her　enemy；　were　alliedwith　foreigners。　Therefore　it　would　have　been　safer　for　her；　both　thenand　before；　not　to　have　been　hated　by　the　people　than　to　have　had　thefortresses。　All　these　things　considered　then；　I　shall　praise　him　whobuilds　fortresses　as　well　as　him　who　does　not；　and　I　shall　blamewhoever；　trusting　in　them；　cares　little　about　being　hated　by　the　people。CHAPTER　XXIHOW　A　PRINCE　SHOULD　CONDUCT　HIMSELF　SO　AS　TO　GAIN　RENOWNNOTHING　makes　a　prince　so　much　esteemed　as　great　enterprises　and　settinga　fine　example。　We　have　in　our　time　Ferdinand　of　Aragon；　the　presentKing　of　Spain。　He　can　almost　be　called　a　new　prince；　because　he　hasrisen；　by　fame　and　glory；　from　being　an　insignificant　king　to　be　theforemost　king　in　Christendom；　and　if　you　will　consider　his　deeds　youwill　find　them　all　great　and　some　of　them　extraordinary。　In　thebeginning　of　his　reign　he　attacked　Granada；　and　this　enterprise　was　thefoundation　of　his　dominions。　He　did　this　quietly　at　first　and　withoutany　fear　of　hindrance；　for　he　held　the　minds　of　the　barons　of　Castileoccupied　in　thinking　of　the　war　and　not　anticipating　any　innovations；thus　they　did　not　perceive　that　by　these　means　he　was　acquiring　powerand　authority　over　them。　He　was　able　with　the　money　of　the　Church　and　ofthe　people　to　sustain　his　armies；　and　by　that　long　war　to　lay　thefoundation　for　the　military　skill　which　has　since　distinguished　him。Further；　always　using　religion　as　a　plea；　so　as　to　undertake　greaterschemes；　he　devoted　himself　with　a　pious　cruelty　to　driving　out　andclearing　his　kingdom　of　the　Moors；　nor　could　there　be　a　more　admirableexample；　nor　one　more　rare。　Under　this　same　cloak　he　assailed　Africa；　hecame　down　on　Italy；　he　has　finally　attacked　France；　and　thus　hisachievements　and　designs　have　always　been　great；　and　have　kept　the　mindsof　his　people　in　suspense　and　admiration　and　occupied　with　the　issue　ofthem。　And　his　actions　have　arisen　in　such　a　way；　one　out　of　the　other；that　men　have　never　been　given　time　to　work　steadily　against　him。Again；　it　much　assists　a　prince　to　set　unusual　examples　in　internalaffairs；　similar　to　those　which　are　related　of　Messer　Bernabo　da　Milano；who；　when　he　had　the　opportunity；　by　any　one　in　civil　life　doing　someextraordinary　thing；　either　good　or　bad；　would　take　some　method　ofrewarding　or　punishing　him；　which　would　be　much　spoken　about。　And　aprince　ought；　above　all　things；　always　to　endeavour　in　every　action　togain　for　himself　the　reputation　of　being　a　great　and　remarkable　man。A　prince　is　also　respected　when　he　is　either　a　true　friend　or　adownright　enemy；　that　to　say；　when；　without　any　reservation；　he　declareshimself　in　favour　of　one　party　against　the　other；　which　course　willalways　be　more　advantageous　than　standing　neutral；　because　if　two　ofyour　powerful　neighbours　e　to　blows；　they　are　of　such　a　characterthat；　if　one　of　them　conquers；　you　have　either　to　fear　him　or　not。　Ineither　case　it　will　always　be　more　advantageous　for　you　to　declareyourself　and　to　make　war　strenuously；　because；　in　the　first　case；　if　youdo　not　declare　yourself；　you　will　invariably　fall　a　prey　to　theconqueror；　to　the　pleasure　and　satisfaction　of　him　who　has　beenconquered；　and　you　will　have　no　reasons　to　offer；　nor　anything　toprotect　or　to　shelter　you。　Because　he　who　conquers　does　not　wantdoubtful　friends　who　will　not　aid　him　in　the　time　of　trial；　and　he　wholoses　will　not　harbour　you　because　you　did　not　willingly；　sword　in　hand；court　his　fate。Antiochus　went　into　Greece；　being　sent　for　by　the　Aetolians　to　drive　outthe　Romans。　He　sent　envoys　to　the　Achaeans；　who　were　friends　of　theRomans；　exhorting　them　to　remain　neutral；　and　on　the　other　hand　theRomans　urged　them　to　take　up　arms。　This　question　came　to　be　discussed　inthe　council　of　the　Achaeans；　where　the　legate　of　Antiochus　urged　them　tostand　neutral。　To　this　the　Roman　legate　answered：　〃As　for　that　which　hasbeen　said；　that　it　is　better　and　more　advantageous　for　your　state　not　tointerfere　in　our　war；　nothing　can　be　more　erroneous；　because　by　notinterfering　you　will　be　left；　without　favour　or　consideration；　theguerdon　of　the　conqueror。〃　Thus　it　will　always　happen　that　he　who　is　notyour　friend　will　demand　your　neutrality；　whilst　he　who　is　your　friendwill　entreat　you　to　declare　yourself　with　arms。　And　irresolute　princes；to　avoid　present　dangers；　generally　follow　the　neutral　path；　and　aregenerally　ruined。　But　when　a　prince　declares　himself　gallantly　in　favourof　one　side；　if　the　party　with　whom　he　allies　himself　conquers；　althoughthe　victor　may　be　powerful　and　may　have　him　at　his　mercy；　yet　he　isindebted　to　him；　and　there　is　established　a　bond　of　amity；　and　men　arenever　so　shameless　as　to　bee　a　monument　of　ingratitude　by　oppressingyou。　Victories　after　all　are　never　so　plete　that　the　victor　must　notshow　some　regard；　especially　to　justice。　But　if　he　with　whom　you　allyyourself　loses；　you　may　be　sheltered　by　him；　and　whilst　he　is　able　hemay　aid　you；　and　you　bee　panions　in　a　fortune　that　may　rise　again。In　the　second　case；　when　those　who　fight　are　of　such　a　character　thatyou　have　no　anxiety　as　to　ore　is　itgreater　prudence　to　be　allied；　because　you　assist　at　the　destruction　ofone　by　the　aid　of　another　who；　if　he　had　been　wise；　would　have